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Introduction
This paper aims to examine how the law and cultural mores worked together to create
and sustain racial slavery in America. Notably, there was a duality to both the law and culture of
America that was undeniably present at the time of its founding and persists in many ways today.
With respect to the law, there was a duality to how it applied, who it applied to, how it was
interpreted, and how it was weaponized. Concerning culture, there was a duality to how social
rules applied akin to the duality noted in the law, and a multiplicity of prevailing cultural values
and beliefs relating to slavery and race. More significantly though, there was a duality to what
America represented and what it meant to be an American. There was, on the one hand, the idea
of a free America with all the privileges, rights and liberties promised to its citizens by the
Constitution. On the other, there was the idea of an oppressive America that provided little
opportunity, a constant threat of enslavement, and none of the protections of freedom and
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. The most important thing to note about duality, however,
is that it refers to two sides of the same thing, not two distinct things. There was—and still is—
unmistakably a duality to American culture and law as this paper will demonstrate, but this is not
a paper about two separate stories of America’s legal history. To be clear, America’s legal history
is one story. The story has multiple chapters, so to speak, but they are all in the same book. The
book is full of contradictions, hypocrisies, disparate treatment, and double standards. It has many
heroes and villains, martyrs and murderers, utterly reproachable moments and moments beyond
reproach, but they are all part of the same story. The story of America is inextricable from the
experiences of Black Americans. That is, the tribulations and triumphs of Black Americans must
be told as part of the American story. This paper seeks to capture the chapter of slavery within
that story as honestly as possible.
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The discussion will begin with an analysis on the origins of racial slavery in colonial
America. That analysis will emphasize the insidious function of the law and preconceptions about
African culture and race in what Winthrop Jordan dubbed “the process of debasement.”1 After
exploring the forces responsible for the creation of racial slavery in colonial America, the focus
will turn to the role of Southern law and culture in sustaining the hegemonic structure of
Southern society that allowed for slavery’s continued survival. With the role of Southern law and
culture put properly in their place, the focus will turn to federal law by examining how the
nation’s highest institutions allowed slavery to survive the birth of a “free” republic.” The part
that the framers and the Constitution of 1787 played in the story of American slavery will be first
considered in the context of Frederick Douglass’s arguments related to whether the Constitution
was pro-slavery or anti-slavery. Next, it will be argued that the Court rendered the Constitution
undeniably pro-slavery through two racially-driven decisions made under the pretense of legal
formalism: Prigg and Dred Scott.2 Congress’s role will be discussed in conjunction with the Dred
Scott case. Finally, the paper will close with a brief comment on the implications of this sinister
part of American history on life in today’s America.
Origins of Racial Slavery: The Law and Cultural Bias in Colonial America
Whether owed to bad intent or lack of foresight, the law played an unfortunate role in
creating a society in which racial slavery could thrive. Though, the law did not operate in a
vacuum: prevailing prejudices about African sexuality and culture, preconceptions surrounding
blackness and whiteness, and the fears and anxieties of the English settlers all played integral
roles in the ultimate creation of racial slavery in the American South. In the mid to late

1
2

WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN 45 (1974).
Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
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seventeenth century, the law and cultural biases effectively debased African Americans and
created a clear and palpable distinction in the way White and Black people living in America were
treated and perceived by the public and the legal system. This section will examine this cultural
“process of debasement”3 and argue that it created a firm foundation for racial slavery in
America. The efficacy of the clearly repugnant institution was entirely dependent on the public
seeing the oppressed class as fundamentally different and inferior. Southern society would have
rejected slavery as repulsive if it saw African-Americans as being equal and deserving of personal
dignity and autonomy. It is therefore unlikely that racial slavery would have survived without this
process of cultural debasement that played on social prejudices to establish laws that
distinguished between the races. In this light, the reproachable impact the law had on this
process begins to look more like a product of bad intent than lack of foresight.
The economic conditions of the South and the Country’s dependence on the Southern
economy were also of incredible significance to the story of slavery. The massive amounts of land
required large-scale, unskilled, and cheap labor to fuel the Tobacco and Cotton industries among
others.4 This demand for labor undoubtedly had a hand in the ultimate creation and maintenance
of slavery in America, but the need for labor does not explain why America’s iteration of slavery
was racially driven and predicated on anti-Black prejudice. This “proses of debasement” in which
the law and culture subjugated and debased African people immediately upon their first arrival
in North America better explains the origins of racial slavery in America.

WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN 45 (1974).
See e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE LAW OF SLAVERY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, in SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH
11-18 (“The cotton economy of the early republic also supported a hierarchical social system , with plantation owners
superior to ordinary farmers and farmers superior to slaves. Reconciling such a social system with democratic
presuppositions that pervaded the nation, including the slave South, could be most easily accomplished by reinforcing
the racist dimensions of Southern slavery: Farmers could think that they were equal to planters, at least politically,
while both were superior to the enslaved blacks.”).
3
4

5

The origins of anti-Black prejudice can be traced back well before the days of slavery. The
prevailing concepts of blackness and whiteness—apart from race—in English and colonial
American society before the Englishmen and Africans first interacted are quite revealing.
Blackness was associated with impurity, darkness and evil. It was considered dirty and filthy, foul
and wicked, repulsive and reproachable. In contrast, whiteness was associated with purity and
virginity, cleanliness and beauty, virtue and righteousness.5 Consequently, upon meeting
Africans, the English were flooded with bewilderment and immediate prejudices based simply on
the color of the Africans’ skin.6 Cultural differences would only serve to exacerbate this sense of
otherness felt toward Africans by the English, but it was unmistakably the color of the Africans’
skin that made them an immediate target for persecution and oppression by the xenophobic
colonists.7 This is arguably evidenced by the difference in the way the colonists treated Native
Americans and Africans. Of course, the colonists committed horrific atrocities against the Native
tribes, but they also saw them as a people worth assimilating into American culture.8 Africans,
on the other hand, were only seen as having potential for free labor. Part of this was likely due
to the social context in which the colonists encountered the two groups of peoples.9 The Native
Americans knowledge of the landscape and its military capacity, for example, made enslaving
them a steep battle.10 Similarly, the cultural differences must have played some role. The
colonists had some respect and reverence for the Native American way of life, they saw them as
having nations and statehood, a sense of community and national or tribal pride. In contrast,
they saw the Africans as being stateless and without religion, laws, hierarchy, or a sense of

WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN 6 (1974).
Id. at 4.
7
Id. at 6.
8
Id. at 12.
9
Id.
10
Id.
5
6
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community and nationalism.11 Africa was one monolithic stateless land mass in the eyes of the
English colonists.12 Yet, to be clear, both Native Americans and Africans were looked at as inferior
and savage heathens by the colonists. The ultimate difference with respect to slavery and
assimilation, however, seems to come down to skin color. The colonists could not separate what
they considered to be the Africans’ “savagery” and heathenism from the Africans’ black skin
tone.13 In fact, the Africans’ perceived heathenism and “savagery” was often viewed by the
English as linked to their blackness.14 To that end, there were some who viewed blackness in man
as the consequence of a biblical curse, God’s Curse on Ham.15 Perhaps this difference in
treatment is due to those preconceptions of blackness that date back centuries. Alternatively,
maybe it is because the English had encountered peoples somewhat similar in complexion to the
Native Americans, such as the Moors, but they had never encountered any group of people with
dark skin tones like those of people from Central and West Africa. 16 Either way, it is clear that it
was the African’s blackness that made the English view him as fundamentally different from both
White people and Native Americans. Further, it was the African’s blackness that the colonists saw
as presenting a practical advantage in that it was a permanent and readily identifiable mark.17
That is not to say that religion, notions of “savagery,” and preconceptions about African
sex and culture were insignificant. To the contrary, those differences only made the English view
their disparate treatment of the Africans as justified. For the English, the Africans’ presumed
godlessness and incivility—taken in combination with the color of their skin—made them a

11

Id. at 13.
Id. at 12-14.
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Id.
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Id. at 13.
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M
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fundamentally different type of person.18 Everything presumed about African culture was
reproachable to English colonial eyes merely because of how fundamentally different it was
presumed to be: their dress, their appearance, their religion, their language, their sexuality. Most
disturbingly, the English would label Africans as animalistic and beastly. “They knew perfectly
well that [Africans] were men, yet they frequently described the Africans as ‘brutish’ or ‘beastial’
or ‘beastly.’”19 For example, the English frequently compared the Africans to apes and fabricated
stories detailing absurd interactions between apes and African people.20 A particularly disgraceful
iteration of these baseless prejudices was the persistent defamatory claim that African women
and apes had sexual relations.21 Similarly, African male sexuality was arbitrarily depicted as
aggressively libidinous and rapacious.22 Though, arguably more important than the actual
prejudices may have been the colonists’ own insecurities underlying these prejudices. Many of
their preconceptions about African culture were ultimately projections of their own insecurities
and anxieties. Most importantly, the colonists had a massive fear of becoming uncivilized. They
were in the new world which necessitated an inherently rugged and remote lifestyle in its early
days. As such, the colonists had a desire to establish their version of civility: law and hierarchical
order. What is worse, they overreacted to anything they found contrary to their own conceptions
of civility.23 As academically interested in the concept of savagery as they may have been, they
were more so repulsed and terrified by the idea of becoming savage themselves.
The fears and insecurities of the early played out in the context of interracial sex and the law
as well. As mentioned, there was a presumption by many white Englishmen in the American

18

Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
20
Id. at 15.
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Id. at 17.
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Id. at 18-20.
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Id. at 12-15.
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colonies that Africans were particularly libidinous and promiscuous. Many of these
preconceptions, which included the idea that Black men lusted White women, could be
characterized as the English colonists projecting anxieties about their own primal instincts and
desires unto the African population out of insecurity. This included, of course, anxieties about
their own sexual inadequacy. Whatever the cause, there was a clear ambivalence—a tension
between “desire” and “aversion”—about interracial sex held by the White population that Jordan
attributes to a deeper, more fundamental dilemma of the day.24 That is, White people saw Black
people as both similar to and different from themselves, and White people feared both sides of
that reality.25
Laws prohibiting and punishing interracial sex and marriage served to reinforce these
prejudice notions about sexuality and race. The same could be said of laws that deemed the
offspring of interracial unions illegitimate,26 and those that classified biracial people as Black, not
White or biracial.27 These laws effectively enlarged the barrier distinguishing White people from
Black people in the eyes of the public which, again, was an integral part of how racial slavery was
able to survive and thrive in the South. In a similar, although arguably more damaging, vein, there
were also laws that significantly distinguished between the races for the purposes of labor and
service.
Specifically, there were two kinds of labor laws enacted before chattel slavery was in full
swing that are particularly jarring with respect to how directly they reinforced the institution in
the Southern colonies. First, there was a declaration by colonial Maryland in 1664 that Black
servants were to serve “Durante Vita,” for life, which was followed by similar declarations in

24

Id. at 70.
Id.
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Id. at 71.
27
Id. at 84.
25
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many other Southern colonies soon after.28 Second, there were various state laws allowing Black
women to be used as field laborers.29 Unsurprisingly, White women could not be used for such
strenuous labor. Although slavery had already taken root in some southern colonies, this manmade legal distinction between the races is what allowed racial slavery to thrive in a society that
paradoxically prided itself on freedom. Most significantly, the laws made it such that owning a
Black servant (which quickly became “slave”) was more valuable than having a White servant.30
A Black servant was a slave, the chattel of his master, and he would be such for his life. Worse
still, his kids would be born slaves. In stark contrast, a White servant was not personal property,
he would not be bound for life, and his kids were born free. Moreover, since a Black female
servant could be used for much more difficult labor than her White counterpart, her service was
inherently more valuable.
As the laws requiring Black servants to serve for life took effect, slavery soon surpassed
indentured servitude. Again, indentured servitude was for White people of a certain lower class,
but chattel slavery was reserved for Americans of African descent and occasionally Native
Americans. Though, the process of debasement did not limit itself to slaves, it was directed at all
African Americans. For example, there were laws barring free Black men from testifying against
White men; laws allowing slaves to testify against free Black men, but prohibiting slaves from
testifying against White men; and references to free Black men in the Southern colonies’ slave
codes. Such laws were blatant attempts to encourage the public to associate free Black men with
enslaved Black men rather than with free White men. This continued an all too familiar theme:
make the slaves, and African Americans more generally, appear to the public, and feel to

28

Id. at 42-45.
Id. at 43-44; 66.
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Id.
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themselves, inferior and worthy of enslavement to justify the morality of the institution of racial
slavery. As Frederick Douglass once put it, “[b]y the laws of the country from whence I came, I
was deprived of myself—of my own body, soul, and spirit.”31
Regardless of whether cultural mores informed the law or the law informed cultural mores,
it cannot be denied that the enactment of a law or a decision by a high court is an expression by
the state that effectively formalizes a government’s position on a given matter. A law that
prohibits interracial sex and distinguishes between White and Black people, for example, sends
a clear message to the public that there is a fundamental difference between these two groups
of people that requires the law to mandate different treatment. Further, a law that distinguishes
between the races disproportionately to the detriment of Black people sends a clear message to
the public that Black people are considered to have a subordinate and inferior role in that society.
Whether the message is effectively ‘you were right to be prejudice’ and only reaffirms the already
widely held cultural mores, or ‘you were wrong for not being prejudice’ and invites new
prejudices is not entirely significant. Either way, the law was being used as a tool to affirm or
reaffirm prejudice in a process which created and sustained cultural norms and social hierarchies
based on those prejudices. This theme would continue virtually uninhibited throughout slavery’s
existence and beyond, especially in the South where the slaveholding class’s hegemony was
strongest.
The Law as a Hegemonic Tool in the American South

31

Frederick Douglass, My Experience and My Mission to Great Britain, 1 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS (eds.
John W. Blassingame) (Yale Univ. Press 1979).
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Looking at the law in the antebellum South as part of a larger cultural hegemony can tell us a
great deal about the nature of Southern society. Most importantly though, it puts the role of law
in its proper place as being the principle vehicle used to maintain the White slaveholders’ control
of the American South.32 Black’s Law Dictionary defines hegemony as “(1) influence, authority,
or supremacy over others” and provides the example of “the hegemony of capitalism.” 33 The
slaveholding class’s control and dominance over the South is best described as a hegemony and
Southern law during the era of slavery is best understood as a hegemonic device. That is, once
slavery was clearly established in the South, the law acted hegemonically to accommodate the
institution and sustain the power hierarchy in place. It is at this stage where the law was most
actively weaponized to reinforce the rights of slave owners, deter slave insurrection, and
reaffirm—in the minds of slave owners and the White community at large—the sinister notion
that the continued enslavement of African Americans was not only justified but in the public
interest.
One interpretation of the relationship between law and hegemony suggests that laws can
be characterized as “attempts by their authors. . . to describe the social relations of their society
in ways that reconciles those relations with the moral traditions widely available in that
society.”34 As the argument goes, hegemony results when the law succeeds in this endeavor,
“allowing the reproduction of existing social relations, because the social relations seem right, or
at least defensible, to the audiences. . . .”35 Thus, there may be an “equally cause and effect”
relationship between law and morals with respect to slavery.36 Many judicial decisions, state

32

EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 26.
“Hegemony,” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
34
Mark Tushnet, Review: Constructing Paternalist Hegemony: Gross, Johnson, and Hadden on Slaves and Masters,
27 L. & SCIENCE INQUIRY 169, 173 (2002).
35
Id. at 173.
36
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN 59 (1974).
33
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statutes, and regulations have served to describe slavery in a way that reconciled it with
society’s morals. Put differently, the law allowed for the continuation of slavery and the
hegemony of White slaveholders by making slavery “seem right, or at least defensible,” to the
majority of people living in the antebellum South.37 Significantly, the slaveholding class was
ostensibly aware of its hegemony over the South. Thus, most laws coming out of state courts
and state legislatures in the South could be characterized as tools intentionally used to maintain
that hegemonic power imbalance.
Consider, for instance, the opinion authored by Judge Ruffin on behalf of the North
Carolina Supreme Court in the infamous 1829 case of State v. Mann.38 As Professor Mark Tushnet
frames it, “[t]he case's content, its exposition of the logic of slavery, might best be understood as
Ruffin's effort to establish, for the entire South, what slavery really required.” 39 Tushnet rightly
points out that Ruffin was attempting to establish the legal foundation that he felt slavery
required. However, Tushnet and other scholars have been far too generous in deeming Ruffin’s
stance on slavery ambivalent.40 It is shocking that abolitionists of the day had any positives to say
about the ‘honesty’ of this opinion. Granted, it was honest about the horrors of slavery, but the
opinion by Judge Ruffin as a whole is perhaps the most blatant and unsettling example of
pretextual judicial conservatism and legal formalism by a high state court, crocodile tears and all.
Ruffin presents an illusion of judicial restraint to excuse an unjust and poorly reasoned decision.
Of course, Ruffin owned plenty of slaves. What is more, he spent a great deal of time and money
as a slave trader, and he also faced claims of cruelty and harsh mistreatment of his own slaves.41

37

Tushnet, supra note 34, at 173.
State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263 (1829)
39
MARK TUSHNET, STATE V. MANN IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE, in SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 85-96.
40
Id.
41
Id.
38
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It is clear that his personal views on slavery crept into his jurisprudence despite all his appeals to
the contrary. The case dealt with the issue of whether “cruel and unreasonable battery on a
slave, by the hirer, is indictable.”42 According to Judge Ruffin, it was not an indictable offense
because the master had near absolute power over his slave as that is what the institution
mandated.43 Ruffin’s rhetoric would lead one to belief that he was genuinely exercising judicial
restraint and repudiated slavery in his personal capacity. Though, under closer examination it is
clear that his decision was far from restrained. The jury in the lower court found Mann liable for
cruelly beating his slave, yet Ruffin reversed and maintained the argument that the public would
not approve had he ruled against Mann despite the public—through the jury—expressing just
the opposite. Time and again, Ruffin suggested that although slavery ought not to be accepted
morally, it was simply the way things were and he, as a judge, could not change that. 44 In reality,
however, Ruffin was doing exactly what Tushnet said he was. That is, Ruffin was establishing the
absolute superiority of the master and the absolute subordinacy of the slave because, as he
openly admits, that is the hierarchical dynamic that the institution of slavery required to run
effectively.45

42

State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263 (1829)
Id. at 266 (“Such obedience is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing else
which can operate to produce the effect. The power of the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the
slave perfect.”).
44
Id.at 268 (“But being brought to it, the Court is compelled to declare, that while slavery exists amongst us in its
present state, or until it shall seem fit to the Legislature to interpose express enactments to the contrary, it will be the
imperative duty of the Judges to recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave, except where the exercise
of it is forbidden by statute.”). See also Id. at 266-67 (“I most freely confess my sense of the harshness of this
proposition, I feel it as deeply as any man can. And as a principle of moral right, every person in his retirement must
repudiate it. But in the actual condition of things, it must be so. There is no remedy. This discipline belongs to the
state of slavery. They cannot be disunited, without abrogating at once the rights of the master, and absolving the slave
from his subjection.”).
45
See e.g., Id. at 266 .(“With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit of the master, his security and the public
safety; the subject, one doomed in his own person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the
capacity to make any thing his own, and to toil that another may reap the fruits.”).
43
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Like Judge Ruffin, many Southern courts and legislatures sought to solidify the
relationship between slaves and slaveowners by reducing slaves to the legal status of property.
In almost all of the South, slaves were treated as personal property under the law.46 In Louisiana,
the one exception in the South, the slave was treated as real property.47 However, in states where
the slave was treated as personal property generally, they were treated as real property for
purposes of inheritance. 48 Similarly, although treated primarily as real property in Louisiana, the
slave “retained many characteristics of chattels personal.” 49 In either case, the point remains the
same: slaves were treated as property rather than as people. Slaves were given free will and the
status of a person only when they were being held ‘accountable’ for ‘misconduct’:
The paradox of the slave’s being at once person and property often disappeared
when he or she committed a crime. In that instance the slave was almost
invariably a person in the eyes of the law. By contrast, when a slave was victimized
by an owner’s cruelty, Louisiana was far more cognizant of the slave as property.
Thus, again, the legal system was rendered inadequate to protect slaves’ most
basic rights. . . .50
Although she was addressing specifically the Louisiana legal system, this quote from author Judith
Schafer can be extended to most of the South. Take, for example, the trial of Celia, a slave who
was hung by the state of Missouri in 1855 for the murder of Robert Newsom. 51 Newsom, a
widower in his late seventies, had bought Celia when she was only 14.52 For five years, Celia was
sexually assaulted and raped by Robert Newsom which resulted in two children.53 At age 19, she
was pregnant for a third time and the father was unknown as she had been romantically involved

46

Kenneth Stampp, Chattels Personal, in The Peculiar Institution 192-236 (1964).
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Judith Kelleher Schafer, “Details are of a Most Revolting Character”: Cruelty to Slaves as Seen in Appeals to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, in SLAVERY & THE LAW 241-267.
51
DeNeen L. Brown, Missouri v. Celia, A Slave: She Killed the White Master Raping Her, then Claimed SelfDefense, WASH. POST (Oct. 19. 2017).
52
Id.
53
Id.
47
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with one of Newsom’s male slaves, George.54 At this point, Celia and George decided that
Newsom’s abuse had to stop. Celia warned Newsom that she would hurt him if he came to her
cabin again, and she asked his adult daughters to keep him away. Of course, he did not oblige.
When Newsom entered Celia’s cabin on June 23, 1855 and tried to force himself on her sexually,
Celia cracked his head with a stick and killed him.55 She was subsequently arrested and charged
with first degree murder. At trial, her attorney argued that she was acting in self-defense under
Missouri law. Despite the obvious veracity of this legal argument, the court denied it and
sentenced her to execution. The court attributed her free will for the killing of her master, but
somehow held she simultaneously lacked the personal autonomy to protect herself against rape
and sexual assault from her master. Celia was “hanged until she died” on December 21, 1855. 56
To be perfectly clear, “the cold language of statutes and judicial decisions made it evident
that, legally, the slave was less a person than a thing.”57 It is quite revealing that slave masters
got compensated for destruction of property when their slaves were injured, killed, or arrested
for crimes.58 The unreported case of Humphreys v. Utz is illustrative of this point.59 In that case,
Henry Utz, a grotesquely abusive overseer, was held liable for damages due to his vicious, cruel
and sadistic beating and murder of a slave called Ginger Pop. Significantly, however, it was a tort
action for destruction of property, not a criminal murder trial.60 Thus, Utz was not held liable for
his disgusting murder of Ginger Pop; rather, he was held liable only for damaging the property of
the plaintiff, Ginger Pop’s master.61 His only punishment for the brutal murder of another human
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being was to pay damages, jail time was never in consideration. Notably, the most silent parties
on most slavery related court records in Southern states were the subjects of the suits
themselves: the slaves.62 Of course, witnesses were almost always white and the jury would often
be made up of landowning White men.63 Further, many of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors and
judges in the Southern courts were active participants in slavery and owned or traded slaves.64
The trial of Celia, the Humphreys case, and State v. Mann were certainly no exceptions to that.
Although legally considered more property than man, the dual nature of African American
slaves was something that Southern law undeniably accounted for—just not in the way one
would have hoped. As Jordan put it, “[c]onsidered as men, slaves raised much more difficult
problems. The most pressing necessity was maintenance of discipline: hence the famous slave
codes.”65

Consequently, a large portion of the slave codes were statutes aimed at the

punishment of runaway and malfeasant slaves, which included punishments like “a specific
number of stripes ‘well laid on,’ all the way, occasionally, to burning at the stake.”66 The slave
codes and other Southern state law also sought to provide an omnipresent, self-enforcing
compliance mechanism, which was also essential to maintaining the slaveholding class’s
hegemony over the South. The law achieved this by placing an obligation directly on slave owners
to punish the misdeeds of their slaves and enforce the various provisions enumerated in a given
state’s slave code.67 Though, even if unenforced, harsh laws had an inherent deterrent effect.
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Ariela Gross, The Law and the Culture of Slavery: Natchez, Mississippi 92-123.
Id.
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Id. at 60.
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Notwithstanding many of the harsh laws calling for cruel punishment of runaway or rebel
slaves, hegemony may also explain many of the more “paternalistic” laws of the day. Take, for
instance, laws that imposed the obligation on masters to care for their old and ailing slaves. Laws
of this nature served two hegemonic functions. Of course, the first was to confirm the nature of
the relationship between slave and master: the slave was the master’s property and
responsibility forever. The second function—to present an image of paternalism—stemmed from
a recognition by the slaveholding class that establishing a paternalistic relationship with the slave
class was essential to the efficacy and public perception of its hegemony over the South. As
Eugene Genovese put it, “[the law] must manifest a degree of evenhandedness sufficient to
compel social conformity; it must, that is, validate itself ethically in the eyes of the several classes,
not just the ruling class.” 68 Consequently, if the slaveholding class was perceived as
overwhelmingly cruel and vulgar in its treatment of slaves, the slave class as well as the nonslaveholding White and free Black class would have rebelled against the institution.
This notion of a “paternalistic hegemony” might similarly explain why slavery and slave
resistance was much different in the United States than in other European colonies in the
Caribbean and South America. The Southern slave masters did not face the same threat of
insurrection and they had “little need for extralegal measures” against their slaves because the
laws already established their roles.69 Thus, the American slave-owners were able to operate
virtually unconcerned with rebellion. However, insurrections that gained traction—often led by
charismatic leaders—were even more impactful because of how rare they were. That Nat Turner,
for example, led a rebellion of over 60 armed slaves resulting in the deaths of over 50 White
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people was incredibly jarring for the slaveholding class and non-slaveholding White class alike in
areas with significant numbers of slaves. So jarring in fact that the local militia groups and mobs
of Angry White men retaliated by beating and killing many slaves accused of participating in the
rebellion. Nat Turner, of course, was executed by the State. Perhaps adding fuel to the fire was
that Thomas Gray, the man who transcribed Nat Turner’s confession, seemingly took liberties in
relaying Nat’s story.70 Presumably, Gray exaggerated Nat’s religiosity and the messiah-like vibe
of the rebellion, used the word “murder” where Nat likely would not have, and portrayed the
rebellion in a dramatically brutal and cold blooded manner.71 This was arguably done to portray
slaves in general as presenting a much larger appetite for violent uprising than they did in
actuality. By painting Nat Turner’s rebellion in such a manner, Gray created the false impression
that slave insurrection was an omnipresent threat to White people in the South. Perhaps Gray
did this simply for journalistic effect, but it is more likely that he was merely a cultural cog in the
hegemonic machine. If slaves were seen as presenting such a grave threat, their continued
enslavement would appear more justified to the public.
On a similar note, that lynching, violence against the Black community and prejudicial
court proceedings arguably got worse after slavery also speaks to the reality that it was the
slaveholding class’s hegemony that allowed for a “paternalistic” iteration of slavery in America.
When the war ended and slavery was abolished, that power structure was seriously disrupted
and the treatment of African Americans became more violent and aggressive as a consequence.
In essence, racist Whites in America were compensating for their loss of control by ramping up
their anger and hate. The Colfax massacre in 1873, for example, resulted in murder of 60 to 150
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African Americans. In the words of historian Eric Foner, “[it was] the bloodiest single instance of
racial carnage in the Reconstruction era, the Colfax massacre taught many lessons, including the
lengths to which some opponents of Reconstruction would go to regain their accustomed
authority.”72 To be clear, there was indisputably abhorrent and morally repugnant mistreatment
of slaves in the American South prior to the war. But, the point is that violence against African
Americans ostensibly got more aggressive when the White ruling class’s control over Southern
society was threatened. It is therefore doubtful that this “paternalistic” iteration of slavery in
America would have occurred had the control of the slaveholding class not been so clearly
delineated.
Ultimately, the role of the law in a slave society is to allow the institution to thrive without
the public developing a guilty conscience: “[the] law acts hegemonically to assure people that
their particular consciences can be subordinated—indeed, morally must be subordinated—to the
collective judgement of society.”73 If the law compels masters to punish runaway slaves, for
example, it is unlikely that the master will feel some sense of immorality for doing what the law
commands him to do. Indeed, he may feel immoral for not doing it. By distinguishing the races
in their status, rights, privileges and protections under the law, the state judges and legislators
of the day sought to suppress doubt about the efficacy and morality of slavery in the minds of
the many classes. Simply put, the law aimed to clearly delineate the roles of each class in society
in a way that upheld slavery and its attendant power structure. Numerous examples of state
explicitly uphold slavery, place the slave master on superior ground, and relegate slaves to the
role of property. From laws that allow and even compel the master to discipline his slave to laws

ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (2011). Foner goes on to say:
“Among blacks in Louisiana, the incident was long remembered as proof that in any large confrontation, they stood
at a fatal disadvantage.”
73
EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 27-28.
72

20

that hold the master accountable for the actions of his slave, the entire corpus of law from the
Southern slave states could be seen as serving the hegemonic end of reinforcing the illusion that
White men were superior to Black men. As a consequence, White men in this country felt that
they could own Black men as personal property without being immoral. The institution of slavery
depended on this illusion, and the illusion was made possible by the law. The next section will
consider how the federal law worked to sustain this illusion at a grand scale.

The Original U.S. Constitution

It is impossible to deny the duality implicit in the Constitution of 1787. It was simultaneously
pro-freedom and pro-slavery. It contained a grand promise of opportunity, due process, and
liberty for some, but a condemnation to undeserved subordinacy and oppression with no process
for others. It was weaponized by slaveowners and racists to reinforce and sustain slavery while
also weaponized by the brightest abolitionist minds of the day to derail the institution. Clearly,
whether the Constitution was pro-slavery or pro-freedom in its effect depended on who was
applying it and who it was being applied to. This section will first briefly discuss Edmund Morgan’s
arguments about the correlation between American freedom and American slavery: the
American paradox as he calls it. Then, Frederick Douglass and his arguments for an anti-slavery
Constitution will be used as a framework for analyzing the most relevant provisions of the original
Constitution to show the founding fathers’ ambivalence toward slavery.
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The American Paradox
Edmund Morgan’s contemplation of the American paradox eloquently captures the duality
and contradiction of American values. Although he does not argue explicitly in constitutional
terms, the contradiction and duality he notes as being prevalent in colonial America undeniably
seeped into the Constitution of 1787. Morgan started with the observation that “the rise of
liberty and equality in this country was accompanied by the rise of slavery.” He noted further,
“[t]hat two such contradictory developments were taking place simultaneously over a long
period of our history, from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth, is the central paradox of
American history.”74 Morgan went on from here to make the nuanced point that slavery and
freedom coevolved in colonial America. Furthermore, prevailing conceptions of freedom and
liberty in American culture were, paradoxically, a direct consequence of slavery in that slavery
inevitably incited an aggressive form of liberalism that is responsible for the staunch personal
rights and liberties granted in documents like the Bill of Rights.75 It is perhaps no coincidence
then that slavery and representative democracy arrived in Jamestown, Virginia in the same year,
1619.76 Similarly, one could view the strong ideas of freedom, resistance and liberty developed
by the African Americans subjected to slavery as another manifestation of this American paradox.
“The challenge” for historians and legal scholars according to Morgan “is to explain how a people
could have developed the dedication to human liberty and dignity exhibited by the leaders of the
American Revolution and at the same time have developed and maintained a system of labor
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that denied human liberty and dignity every hour of the day.”77 The point of including this brief
discussion on Morgan’s work here is threefold. First, it is significant to simply to note that the
duality of American values and principles and the consequent inconsistent nature of the original
Constitution had roots deep in American culture, dating back well before 1787. Second, as the
following section will hopefully manifest, the Constitution is perhaps the best example, at least
in document form, of this American paradox in action. Moreover, the Constitution is illustrative
of the contradictory stances held by the founding fathers that Morgan consistently references in
his work. Third, it is a fitting way to preface Douglass’s arguments as a framework for analyzing
the Constitution in that his argument was itself representative of the American paradox. A free
African-American abolitionist was effectively excusing the framers’ ambivalence toward slavery
evident in the language of original Constitution.

Frederick Douglass on Whether the Constitution was Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery

At first blush, one might be struck with confusion or even frustration by some of
Douglass’s arguments related to the original Constitution. How could such a brilliant man, and an
abolitionist at that, not see the Constitution for what it was? Why would he go beyond the text
to give the Constitution of 1787 an anti-slavery tinge? How could Douglass ignore the undeniable
language that explicitly recognized the idea of “property in man”? After some deliberation, one’s
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irritation and confusion should fade as the realization dawns on them: Douglass made this
argument because he had more foresight than his opponents who shared the same goal of
abolition. What he was saying was this: if we allow the constitution to be labeled as pro-slavery
then we allow it to be used as a mechanism for perpetuating slavery. Instead, as the argument
goes, we need to make it look anti-slavery and pro-freedom so those in opposition to abolition
will be forced to admit that slavery does not comport with the Constitution.78 In other words, we
need to utilize the Constitution as a tool for ending slavery: weaponize it in the name of freedom,
rather than letting it be weaponized in the name of slavery. Nonetheless, one might wonder if
Douglass would stick to his argument today in a world where racial chattel slavery in America has
been abolished with no chance of making a comeback as many of the problematic provisions
have been rendered dead letter by amendments—mass incarceration notwithstanding. Would
he still argue that the Constitution as written in 1787 was anti-slavery? It is hard to believe that
he would given his genius and the obvious error in his legal conclusions.
For example, Douglass argued that Article 1, section 2, clause 379—the notorious threefifths clause—was actually anti-slavery and an intentional “disability” to slave states “by giving
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an increase of ‘two-fifths’ of political power to the free over slave states.”80 But, Douglass’s
argument rests on a big assumption: the happening of an actual political movement in which this
extra political power would be used to end slavery and promote freedom. Without the political
will to end slavery, that extra political power does nothing more than give free states an
advantage on issues totally unrelated to slavery. Thus, it might have the potential to be used as
an anti-slavery tool, but it does not read as an intrinsically anti-slavery provision. To get there,
one needs to read beyond the actual plain letter of the law. It must be conceded, however, that
this particular provision similarly cannot be said to be intrinsically pro-slavery: the plain language
of this clause neither facilitates slavery nor freedom. Rather, it is an example of an instance
where the Constitution—taken in its best light—is passively against slavery. Though, as historian
Paul Finkelman has pointed out, this provision actually ended up protecting slavery in practice.
Due to the massive amount of slaves in the South, counting them—even if only as three-fifths a
person—actually meant more political power (more representatives) for slave states. 81
Douglass also discussed Article I, Section 9, clause, which is perhaps the most glaring
example of the original Constitution being pro-slavery.82 Frankly, Douglass’s argument did not
address this provision in a meaningful way. Instead, he chose to focus on the portion about
Congress’s right, or lack thereof, to prohibit the slave trade. The language of this provision
unambiguously allows human trafficking and the slave trade to persist with clear language
treating people as property. “Migration or Importation of such Persons,” for example, clearly
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reflects an idea of property in man. Goods are imported, people are not—people emigrate and
immigrate. Further, if that was not clear enough, it actually says that a tax can be imposed “on
such importations.” Again, the language blatantly treats persons as imported goods, duty and all.
As for the portion of the clause about Congress being prohibited from ending slavery until 1808,
Douglass said that this language actually provides for the abolition of the slave trade and a means
to end slavery.83 In fact, however, it says that the slave trade cannot be abolished before 1808,
but it does not say—anywhere—that it must or will be abolished after that date. Although he
may be right about that being the framers’ intention, the language lends itself to no such
conclusion. Curiously, he also said that “it showed the intentions of the framers were good, not
bad.”84 The framers’ intentions may well have been good, but this language certainly does not
prove that. They gave the slave states a grace period where those states knew—with a virtual
guarantee by the supreme law of the land—that the slave trade would persist uninterrupted until
1808. It is also worth mentioning that even if construed as Douglass suggests, the slave trade
could end without enslaved men being freed. Prohibiting the slave trade—which is not a
guarantee after the twenty years by the clause’s own language—would be a way to let slavery
slowly die, which appears to be more passive on slavery than anti-slavery.
Significantly, Douglass also addressed Article IV, section 2, clause 3, which is commonly
referred to as the fugitive slave clause.85 Douglass argued that this provision did not apply to
slaves at all and instead applied to indentured servants. His argument was essentially that, being
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“a simple article of property” and not a person with personal rights, a slave cannot owe service.86
There are many problems apparent with his analysis here. To start, the three-fifths clause refers
explicitly to slaves as being persons, and although it only counts them as three-fifths a person,
they are nonetheless a person for the purposes of the Constitution. Further, it does not read “no
person held in service or labor for a term of years,” which would reasonably be read as applying
to indentured servants only. Instead it reads “no person held in service or labor in one State,”
which could easily be read as applying to both slaves and indentured servants. Also, the framers
had already shown in the three-fifths clause that they knew how to be much more explicit when
referring specifically to indentured servants: “Including those bound to service for a term of
years.” And, as we know, this is the principal distinction between what makes someone a slave
versus an indentured servant. Why then would the framers, as brilliant and knowledgeable as
they were, not be specific about indentured servants in this article? It is simple: they were not
talking about indentured servants (or not solely about indentured servants), they were referring
principally to slaves.
To reiterate, Douglass made the arguments that he did because he recognized that the times
demanded that the Constitution be given an anti-slavery and pro-freedom read so that it could
be used as a tool to end slavery. After all, what could be more powerful a tool than the supreme
law of the land. Douglass likely also recognized that the best way to change the system was to
change it from within. It would surely be a much taller task to abolish the whole Constitution
than to abolish slavery as being inconsistent with the Constitution. However, even if Douglass
and others were able to make some clever arguments that allowed abolitionists to weaponize it

86

Douglass, supra note 78, at 475. Note the language used here. It is interesting that he would use this language when
his whole argument is built on the notion that the Constitution does not recognize the idea of property in man.

27

against slavery, it seems clear in retrospect that the original language of Constitution was,
regrettably, not anti-slavery. This also may have been required of the framers in that they would
have been hard pressed to unify the country through the establishment of the Constitution had
they been aggressively anti-slavery as the Southern states never would have ratified. Therefore,
it may be that the framers made every effort to be anti-slavery and pro-freedom where they
could, but the Constitution as a whole was, construed in its worst light, pro-slavery. Even in its
best light—assuming that the framers did plan for some language to be used as a mechanism for
ending slavery at some later date—these troubling provisions demonstrate that the Constitution
was not, at its inception and in in its immediate effect, anti-slavery. To be an anti-slavery
document, it would need a generous, perhaps even intellectually dishonest, interpretation.
Nonetheless, Douglass’s point on the responsibility of judges and lawyers to use their interpretive
capacities to fight against slavery is well-taken. As Douglass saw it, the law is what those tasked
with interpreting it say it is.

The Supreme Court’s Role in Maintaining Slavery
Fittingly, the topic of judicial interpretation brings our discussion to the significance of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on slavery. Although none of the freedom suit cases heard by the
Marshall Court that will be addressed here spoke directly to the Constitution, Marshall’s proslavery opinions are worth examining as they set the stage for an unsettling trend of pretextual
judicial restraint. Then, the focus will turn to Justice Story’s perturbing constitutional
rationalization of slavery in Prigg v. Pennsylvania. Lastly, Chief Justice Taney’s racist rhetoric and
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feigning of judicial restraint and the troubling implications of Dred Scott v. Sandford will be
examined.
Chief Justice Marshall & His Pro-Slavery Jurisprudence
Despite his heroics for the Court, like establishing judicial review and Constitutional
supremacy, Marshall’s relatively small line of cases relating to slavery have caused many to
question the legal community’s widespread reverence for the Chief Justice that shaped the Court
and American constitutional law. As was the case with Judge Ruffin, Marshall was a slaveholder
in his personal capacity, and not a meager one at that.87 Marshall was also outspokenly against
the idea of free Black people in American society, and he even petitioned the Virginia legislature
to fund the removal of free Black people from the state. 88 To what extent his personal views on
slavery and race crept into his jurisprudence on the Court is not entirely clear, but it appears safe
to say that they did to some degree. For example, every majority opinion issued by Marshall in a
case involving a slave resulted in the slave losing.89 As Finkelman points out, what is more
concerning is that Marshall, a famously courageous and creative Justice, often hid behind legal
formalism and judicial conservativism in the slavery cases he heard by taking an
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uncharacteristically strict and narrow approach to judicial interpretation.90 Yet, when “statutes
and precedent were on the side of freedom,” Marshall would still issue decisions supporting the
institution of slavery.91 Thus, his jurisprudence in slavery related cases can be characterized as
altogether legally inconsistent: conveniently adhering to the operative text and precedent when
it supported slavery, but ignoring or straining the operative text and precedent when it hindered
slavery. The constitutional significance of Marshall’s decisions may not be immediately clear with
the absence of direct constitutional challenges to slavery, but in retrospect one could arguably
view the Marshall Court’s pro-slavery opinions—particularly those actually authored by
Marshall—as laying the groundwork for the Court’s inevitable constitutional jurisprudence on
the matter in later cases like Prigg and Dred Scott. Of course the holdings in many of the Marshall
Court’s slavery cases are troubling, but the ad-hoc application of legal formalism and the feigning
of judicial restraint to either defend slavery or avoid questions about its legitimacy is equally, if
not more, disconcerting.
Take, for example, the case in which Marshall denied a woman claiming her freedom
based on ancestry from presenting affidavits proving her great-grandmother’s freedom.92
Despite being made aware of state practices suggesting that such evidence was generally
admissible in similar contexts,93 Chief Justice Marshall took an unreasonably strict view of the
hearsay rule and denied the plaintiff her freedom.94 In contrast, he hypocritically upheld the trial
court’s decision to admit the hearsay evidence offered by the White man claiming to own the
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plaintiff that suggested that the plaintiff’s mother was a slave. 95 In that same case, Marshall hid
behind a strict application of the law in denying the removal of a juror that the plaintiffs objected
to on the grounds that their objection was not made prior to the juror being sworn in.96 To make
matters worse, Marshall upheld the trial court’s removal of an anti-slavery juror noting that “it
was desirable to submit the case to those who felt no bias either way; and therefore the Court
exercised a sound discretion in not permitting him to be sworn.” 97 Yet, pro-slavery jurors were
allowed to serve. Moreover, this decision had a pernicious effect in practice well beyond its
damning impact on the plaintiff in that case. As Justice Gabriel Duvall noted in dissent: “a decision
that hearsay evidence in such cases shall not be admitted, cuts up by the roots all claims of the
kind, and puts a final end to them, unless the claim should arise from a fact of recent date, and
such a case will seldom, perhaps never, occur.”98 The most bewildering part may be that Chief
Justice Marshall ignored the settled law from Southern slave states while purporting to adhere
strictly to the law.99 He would have been far from the first judge to admit such evidence in a case
of this kind.100 Marshall could have easily settled this case in favor of the plaintiff without
disturbing the law of Southern states and principles of federalism or threatening the state of the
union. That case is but one example in a series of anti-Black freedom decisions by Marshall.
Although his rhetoric may not have been as racially charged as Taney’s in Dred Scott, his opinions
demonstrate a firm commitment to upholding slavery and oppressing Black Americans.
Consistent with the example set by the Chief Justice, the Court would proceed to hide behind
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legal formalism and judicial restraint while issuing legally inconsistent opinions riddled with
sinister racist undertones for over a century. Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott, for example, was in
effect the antithesis of legal formalism and judicial conservatism, but his rhetoric appealed to
those principles—as well as racist ones.101 Similarly, although Justice Story’s rhetoric was less
disturbing, his formalistic constitutional justification for slavery and deference to the status quo
in Prigg was equally concerning.
Prigg v. Pennsylvania
Prigg could be viewed as a paradigm shifting case that set the stage for the legal battle over
abolition in the courts that was inextricably connected to the happening of the Civil War. It was
paradigm shifting in that it unintentionally provided abolitionist lawyers with a new kind of legal
challenge to slavery. But, that positive consequence came in a formalistic opinion by Justice Story
that detailed a disconcerting constitutional justification for the efficacy of slavery. The holding in
Prigg made it unequivocally clear that the Constitution as originally written was pro-slavery.
Admittedly, some might argue that, while it did render the Constitution pro-slavery, this case
instead bolsters the argument that it was the racist judges and lawyers of the day that gave the
Constitution it’s pro-slavery tinge, rather than the text itself. Although, the analysis of the
Constitution and Frederick Douglass above arguably reveals otherwise. But, even if that point is
conceded, it is a distinction without a difference. As Douglass taught us, the meaning of a law is
largely (if not solely) determined by what those tasked with interpreting it perceive it to mean.
In this case, the body with ultimate authority on interpreting the Constitution posed a textual
argument stating that a provision of the Constitution was unambiguously a fugitive slave clause
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that prevents runaway slaves from escaping into non-slaveholding states.102 Regardless of
whether it is the inherent meaning of the text or simply the Court’s interpretation of it that
renders it so, this cases makes it clear that the Constitution was a pro-slavery document in
practice. Thus, the Constitution was effectively a tool in the anti-abolitionists toolbox.
The holding—that a Pennsylvania law allowing fugitive slaves refuge from slavery
contravened Article IV and was thus unconstitutional—was significant in its own right as it made
any state law contravening the fugitive slave clause or the subsequent fugitive slave act
unconstitutional. Thus, runaway slaves were left with no recourse or right to due process if
caught and forced back into slavery. What is worse, the state law at issue in this case was actually
meant to protect free African Americans from being sold into slavery. Thus, as discussed in an
article by Professor Newmyer and Professor Lahav, Story’s opinion goes further than just
damaging runaway slaves. The holding, like many other decisions and laws that upheld slavery,
threatened the rights of all African Americans living in the country, free or slave.103 However,
the way Story framed the issue contextually—that the success of the union was ultimately
dependent on this clause’s existence and continued efficacy—makes that holding even more
troubling in that it painted slavery in the image of this immovable object in the American South.
104

That is, immovable to the extent that one wants to keep the union intact. Story makes it clear

to the nation as a whole that the slave owners’ right to own slaves would—as per the
Constitution—take precedent over the peoples’ moral objections to the institution of slavery. It
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effectively says that, even when a slave has found refuge in a free state that has affirmatively
condemned slavery in its own laws, the master’s right to the slave’s labor will always prevail and
that fugitive slave will be forced back into slavery without due process of law. Notably, Story took
a page out of Chief Justice Marshall’s playbook and used language alluding to judicial restraint
and legal formalism to justify his narrow reading of the Constitution:
[I]t may be well, in order to clear the case of difficulty, to say, that in the
exposition of this part of the constitution, we shall limit ourselves to those
considerations which appropriately and exclusively belong to it, without laying
down any rules of interpretation of a more general nature.105
Story also consistently referred to textualist principles—tools of legal formalism and judicial
restraint—as he upheld slavery and defended its efficacy.106 As alluded to earlier in this
subsection, however, this case had some unintended positive consequences. In essence, the
infringement on federalism implicit in this decision caused a paradigm shift to the way in which
abolitionist lawyers approached their cases: radical lawyers in free states were now inclined to
use principles of due process under state law to challenge pro-slavery federal laws.107 The radical
bar in Massachusetts, for example, wasted no time in exploiting Story’s reasoning and using it
against slavery. Prigg effectively motivated anti-slavery, pro-freedom lawyers and set the legal
battle for abolition on an unstoppable track by unknowingly providing a strong legal framework
for those lawyers to build their cases upon. Inevitably, this unstoppable force (the radical bar’s
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commitment to eroding and ending slavery) would collide with the immovable object (the
institution of slavery in the American South).
Dred Scott v. Sandford
To reiterate, the impact that judges and elected officials had on slavery at the federal level
leading up to the Dred Scott case was overwhelmingly one of reinforcement and accommodation.
As illustrated, this was frequently done through patently racist and poorly reasoned decisions
and misguided legislation. But, it was at times a more subtle product of a squandered opportunity
or a passing of the buck. The context surrounding the Dred case, the Court’s decision, and the
subsequent Lincoln-Douglas debates stand as examples of both the subtle and the blatant
failures of Congress and the Court in defending freedom during the era of slavery. Congress
kicked the can down the road to the Court with respect to the issue of slavery,108 and the Court
squandered the opportunity to uphold freedom. Instead, Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion
continued the Court’s disturbing trend of appealing to legal formalism to uphold slavery and hide
behind the law. Although, to be sure, Taney’s façade was by far the most transparent.
Unsurprisingly, Taney—like others on the Dred Scott Court—owned slaves in his personal
capacity.109 Even more unsurprising, Taney was a staunch racist and believer in White supremacy,
as evidenced by his grotesque rhetoric in this case.110 He constantly referred to Black people as
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an “inferior,” “unfortunate,” “unhappy,” or “subordinate” race, and he referred to White people
as the “dominant” race. 111
The racist rhetoric was despicable without doubt, but, again, it was also troubling that Taney
feigned judicial restraint while simultaneously creating new law and limiting congressional
power.112 For example, Taney used language like, “[i]t is not the province of the Court to decide
upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question
belonged to the political or law-making power. . . .”113 Yet, his opinion was doing exactly that.
That is, deciding upon the policy or impolicy of Congress’s past decisions and Missouri State law;
namely, the Missouri Compromise and the Missouri citizenship requirements. In familiar fashion,
Taney purported to take a textual approach in suggesting that Congress’s right to regulate the
territories of the United States under Article IV, section 3, clause 4 of the Constitution only
applied to the territories in the Union at the time of the Constitution’s enactment. 114 It should be
obvious that such an argument is logically and legally inconsistent with most understandings of
Congress’s power under the Constitution—textual and contextual based interpretations alike. It
is simply an incoherent argument to suggest that this power of Congress to regulate, which is in
a section addressing Congress’s power to make new states, is limited to old states and territories.
It would effectively render an explicit power of Congress toothless in the new territories that
likely most needed congressional assistance.
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Worse still, he did not need to offer such a broad constitutional holding on Congress’s power
to regulate slavery in the new territories to uphold the decision against Scott. Dred Scott lost the
case in the lower courts pursuant to Missouri Law, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act—an act that
made slavery a state by state question dependent on popular sovereignty which was chiefly
sponsored by Senator Stephen Douglas—effectively repealed the Missouri Compromise three
years earlier. Taney simply could have upheld the lower court’s ruling under Missouri Law and
deemed the Missouri Compromise void by the Kansas-Nebraska act. It would not be a stretch to
suggest that most judges and jurists would consider a broad constitutional holding to be the
antithesis of judicial conservativism, especially when not needed to reach the desired conclusion.
So much, then, for Taney’s self-proclaimed judicial restraint. To be clear, it still would have been
a troubling pro-slavery decision had he decided the case against Dredd by other means, but at
least it would have been consistent with a theory of judicial conservativism. The same charges of
pretextual judicial conservativism and extreme legal formalism could be cast at Taney for the
more well-known holding in that case regarding African American citizenship. Taney ruled that
African Americans—whether currently slaves or the descendants of slaves—were not considered
citizens of the United States and thus not entitled to the rights and protections of the
Constitution.115 Taney acted as though he was simply applying the law, but his convoluted
reasoning on this issue blatantly exposes his façade. He was not being conservative or restrained
by any definition as the citizenship question was not even an issue in front of the Court. The lower
courts decided that Scott was a citizen under Missouri law while also holding that he was a slave.
Dred Scott certainly did not appeal the lower court’s decision on his citizenship; rather, he
appealed the court’s decision as to his status a slave.
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Taney consistently grounded his pro-slavery arguments in in unreasonably originalist
arguments about the framers’ ideologies and personal lives. For example, he made the
convoluted argument that, because the framer’s owned slaves and were ambivalent about
slavery, it is unlikely that they would have included African American’s in their definition of
citizenship—even when freed. Taney was indeed hiding behind the law under false pretenses,
but he was doing it quite conspicuously. As Finkelman put it quite succinctly:
Taney’s opinion illustrates the folly of using an intentionalist analysis when the
intentions of the framers were clearly mixed, uncertain, and contradictory. Taney
offered an unsophisticated historical claim that was a thinly disguised political
argument designed to destroy the republican party and any opposition to the
spread of slavery into the territories.116
Taney’s disturbing portrayal of American values taken together with the holdings of the case also
serve as a stark demonstration of the truly exclusive nature of American law and culture at that
time:
It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognized as citizens in the several
States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other; it was
formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else. . . .It was
the union of those who were at that time members of distinct and separate
political communities into one political family. . . .117

It is language such as this that takes this case into its own class of repugnancy. A pro-slavery
decision that denied Dred Scott his freedom was bad enough, but to go as far as Taney went was
a needless atrocity unmatched in its moral reprehensibility as far as this writer is concerned.
Consider, in sharp contrast, the alternatives that the Court had. Of course, reversing the lower
court’s decision regarding slavery and affirmatively holding that Congress had the right to ban
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slavery in the Union would have been the most preferrable. Unfortunately, that decision was
unlikely to happen given the Court’s makeup. More realistically, Justice McLean suggested that
the Court take an approach more consistent with federalism that would have also freed Dred
Scott.118 While respecting state rights and preserving Congress’s right to regulate new territories,
he argued that Congress had the authority to establish and regulate the internal affairs of a
territory such as Wisconsin.119
Justice Curtis’s dissent, however, offered the more powerful repudiation of Taney’s
decision. It also painted a more compelling picture of an alternative path for the Court to take.
Of course, he dissented vehemently on the citizenship question and stressed that all people born
and naturalized in any of the individual states are citizens of this country.120 On the question of
Congress’s authority, Curtis personally thought that Congress had the power to ban slavery in the
states, but—taking a genuinely textual and conservative approach—he recognized that it was a
political question of principle requiring immense resources.121 Thus, according to Curtis, it was
not for the Court to decide. Although either of these courses of action outlined by the dissenting
justices would have been much preferred to Taney’s decision, neither would have done enough
to settle the issue of slavery in America. The significance of Curtis’s dissent, however, was that
it manifested that the “road not taken” was the road that Taney purported he was on; that is,
the road of judicial restraint.122
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The debates over the legitimacy of the Court and the issue of Slavery between Abraham
Lincoln and Stephen Douglas that ensued after this case reflect the widespread dissatisfaction
regarding the Court’s decision and the status of slavery in the union. According to Douglas,
slavery had to be a question decided by the states under principles of popular sovereignty.
Though, whether he was actually indifferent to Slavery as he presumes to be was seriously
questionable to Lincoln.123 To that end, perhaps Douglas argued for a theory of popular
sovereignty because it was clear that slavery would be supported by such a theory if applied in
the South. Either way, popular sovereignty was exactly what Congress contrived in 1854 with the
Kansas-Nebraska Act authored by Senator Douglas himself.124 As Lincoln frames it, however, this
was an inherently unsustainable plan for a unified country.
“A house divided against itself cannot stand.” I believe this government cannot
endure, permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be
dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be
divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other.125

This sentiment of untenable turbulence and tension expressed by Lincoln was well-founded.
Obviously, the country went to war over slavery within a few years of the famous debates, but a
mini-civil war had already been happening in Kansas. In response to the Kansas-Nebraska Act,
from 1854-1849, there was a series of violent confrontations in the Kansas territory as a
consequence of the rising political tensions surrounding the slavery debate in the territory. It was
essentially a one-state civil war over slavery, commonly referred to as ‘bleeding Kansas,’ that
foreshadowed what was to come for the rest of this country.
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It seems fitting to juxtapose the brief discussion on Lincoln with the brief point that the
Supreme Court cases focused on here—Dred Scott and Prigg—also set the stage for what the end
to slavery, beyond a civil war of course, would have to look like: a constitutional amendment.
The Constitution was pro-slavery according to the Supreme Court. Thus, amending the
Constitution after the war to make it anti-slavery would be the only way to officially end the
institution without throwing out the baby (the Constitution as a whole) with the bathwater (the
parts of it that were pro-slavery or anti-freedom).
These cases and laws demonstrate the duality of American law and culture in a jarring way.
This is the cruel and exclusive nature of the American legal system that Frederick Douglass was
alluding to when he said “their laws, their judges, their representatives and legislators.”126 Worse
still, this trend would not end with slavery.
Closing Remarks: The Long-Lasting Implications of the Law’s Approach to Race in America
Despite all the nuanced duality noted in the laws, there is one example of duality that
stands out above all else. To reiterate, that is the duality of what it meant, and now means, to be
an American. For many Black people in the country during the time of slavery, it meant a life of
forced labor, gross mistreatment, unsolicited racism, and an utter lack of rights, liberty and
opportunity. Consequently, what it means to be an American today in 2020 is, for many, a long
ancestral history of being oppressed and abused by one’s own government and neighbors. For
many, it also means facing pervasive prejudice on a daily basis in a variety of ugly forms—each
one more backhanded than the last. Including, to be clear, being subjected to the conscious and
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subconscious biases of those responsible for the drafting, interpretation, and enforcement of the
law.
It is fair to say that American law has failed the Black community consistently from 1619
through 2020. When slavery ended and African Americans had seemingly gained legitimate rights
and liberties, the Court destroyed the civil rights amendments and continued its long-standing
tradition of hiding behind the law when faced with issues concerning racism in America. In the
Slaughter House Cases, the Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment only prohibits chattel
slavery as experienced by African Americans before the war.127 In that same decision, the Court
also held that the privileges and immunities clause of Fourteenth Amendment only protects
rights guaranteed by the United States and not rights guaranteed by the states. 128 About a decade
later, the Court again offered a narrow reading of the Constitution and held that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protections against discrimination only allowed Congress to prohibit
discrimination by state actors under the Civil Rights Act of 1875.129 Perhaps worst of all, however,
was the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson case in which the Court held that racially segregated public
accommodations do not violate the Equal Protection Clause provided that they are “separate but
equal.”130 Although, it is worth noting that Justice Harlan’s dissent in that case—despite
expressing his personal racist, White supremacy sentiments—is the genesis of the color-blind
Constitution theory.131 At the state level, Jim Crow laws and segregation took root immediately
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after the war and continued the abhorrent treatment and calculated oppression of Black people
in this country for nearly a century. Worse still, racially charged violence against Black Americans
from the public at large seemingly increased after the war ended and slavery was abolished
because the power structure was rattled.
Today, there remains disparate impact, enforcement and application of the law—
including police brutality, racial profiling, significant differences in sentencing, and
disproportionate enforcement of non-violent drug laws tied to mass incarceration. Of course,
this also translates into prejudices in social and professional settings. Most appalling, however,
is the largely unaddressed issue of generational poverty caused as a consequence of Slavery and
all its vestiges—such as, mass incarceration and discrimination in housing, voting, education and
the work place—that has plagued so many Black communities. Suffice it to say, racism is
America’s original sin and anti-Black racism is its worst iteration, slavery is just the most patently
reprehensible manifestation of that sin.
As these practices and historical facts continue to go unaddressed or underappreciated,
the dual nature of what it means to be an America will persist. Racism and slavery are often
thought of and taught as being dark parts of history that do not represent who we are as
Americans, which may be true in some ways. It is indeed a dark and regrettable part of history,
but it is our history and it’s still plaguing us in 2020—we ought to reckon with that reality. It ought
to be mentioned that the founding fathers were, at best, ambivalent about slavery when framing
the Constitution every time the founding of this country is discussed. That the Supreme Court of
the United States has a reproachable history of pro-slavey and other racially-driven jurisprudence
should be common knowledge. Frederick Douglass should not only be discussed as a great African
American thinker and historical figure, but rather should be recognized as a great American
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thinker and figure. His unparalleled foresight and brilliance ought to be discussed concurrently
with the most revered American legal thinkers and writers of his day—the anti-slavery ones and
pro-slavery ones alike—with each in their proper place. Of course, examining our past as a
historian or legal scholar requires an honest recognition of the duality of our culture and law.
But, that being said, one cannot separate slavery, racism and the struggles and achievements of
Black Americans from the rest of American history. Again, American history is one story. A story
with duality, abhorrent racial distinctions, and bewildering contradictions no doubt, but a single
story nonetheless. John Marshall, Frederick Douglass, Joseph Story, Dred Scott, Abraham Lincoln,
Celia, and Nat Turner are all part of that same American story. It is time we start telling it that
way.
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